An introduction to the birth of criminal positivism in Europe and Latin America at the end of the 19th century: rise and resistance by Masferrer Domingo, Aniceto









Institute for Social, Political and Legal Studies 
(Valencia, Spain) 
 
Honorary Chief Editor 
Antonio Pérez Martín, University of Murcia 
 
Chief Editor 
Aniceto Masferrer, University of Valencia 
 
Assistant Chief Editors 
Wim Decock, University of Leuven 
Juan A. Obarrio Moreno, University of Valencia 
 
Editorial Board 
Isabel Ramos Vázquez, University of Jaén (Secretary) 
José Franco-Chasán, University of Augsburg 
Fernando Hernández Fradejas, University of Valladolid 
Anna Taitslin, Australian National University – University of Canberra 
M.C. Mirow, Florida International University 
José Miguel Piquer, University of Valencia 
Andrew Simpson, University of Aberdeen 
 
International Advisory Board 
Javier Alvarado Planas, UNED; Juan Baró Pazos, University of Cantabria; Mary Sarah Bilder, Boston 
College; Orazio Condorelli, University of Catania; Emanuele Conte, University of Rome III; Daniel R. 
Coquillette, Boston College – Harvard University; Serge Dauchy, University of Lille; Salustiano de Dios, 
University of Salamanca; José Domingues, University of Lusíada; Seán Patrick Donlan, The University 
of the South Pacific; Matthew Dyson, University of Oxford; Antonio Fernández de Buján, University 
Autónoma de Madrid; Remedios Ferrero, University of Valencia; Manuel Gutan, Lucian Blaga 
University of Sibiu; Alejandro Guzmán Brito, Pontificial Catholic University of Valparaiso; Jan 
Hallebeek, VU University Amsterdam; Dirk Heirbaut, Ghent University; Richard Helmholz, University 
of Chicago; David Ibbetson, University of Cambridge; Emily Kadens, University of Northwestern; Mia 
Korpiola, University of Turku; Pia Letto-Vanamo, University of Helsinki; David Lieberman, University 
of California at Berkeley; Jose María Llanos Pitarch, University of Valencia; Marju Luts-Sootak, 
University of Tartu; Magdalena Martínez Almira, University of Alicante; Pascual Marzal Rodríguez, 
University of Valencia; Dag Michaelsen, University of Oslo; María Asunción Mollá Nebot, University of 
Valencia; Emma; Montanos Ferrín, University of La Coruña; Olivier Moréteau, Louisiana State 
University; John Finlay, University of Glasgow; Kjell Å Modéer, Lund University; Anthony Musson, 
University of Exeter; Vernon V. Palmer, Tulane University; Agustin Parise, Maastricht University; 
Heikki Pihlajamäki, University of Helsinki; Jacques du Plessis, Stellenbosch University; Merike Ristikivi, 
University of Tartu; Remco van Rhee, Maastricht University; Luis Rodríguez Ennes, University of Vigo; 
Jonathan Rose, Arizona State University; Carlos Sánchez-Moreno Ellar, University of Valencia; 
Mortimer N.S. Sellers, University of Baltimore; Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde, University of Bergen; Ditlev 
Tamm, University of Copenhagen; José María Vallejo García-Hevia, University of Castilla-La Mancha; 
Norbert Varga, University of Szeged; Tammo Wallinga, University of Rotterdam; José Luís Zamora 
Manzano, University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 
 
Citation 
Yves Cartuyvels, Aniceto Masferrer, “An introduction to the birth of criminal positivism in Europe and 
Latin America at the end of the 19th century: rise and resistance”, GLOSSAE. European Journal of Legal 
History 17 (2020), pp. 1-21 (available at http://www.glossae.eu) 






An introduction to the birth of criminal positivism in Europe and 




Université Saint-Louis- Bruxelles 
 
Aniceto Masferrer 






Summary: 1. Introduction: contextual grid. 2. The reception and discussion of criminal 




1. Introduction: contextual grid 
 
In the Western world, the end of the 19th century is marked by the birth of 
criminology. This new discipline, which, from the outset, was created as an auxiliary 
science to criminal law, calls into question the traditional criminal law which was the 
dominating theory and practice of the time. This new “truth regime” on crimes, criminals 
and sentences, in the Foucauldian sense of the term1, arises in a specific context from an 
epistemological, political and legal point of view. 
 
From an epistemological perspective, that time is marked by the advent of 
scientific positivism. By distancing itself from the philosophical and metaphysical 
approaches that dominated until that time, scientific discourse takes a positivist turn: 
anchored in reality, science will, from now on, privilege an empirical approach based on 
observation, experimentation and testing, in order to update the laws of nature and unveil 
the major causes of the phenomena that are observed. First observed within the natural 
sciences, this epistemological attitude is quickly transmitted into the social sciences in 
order to study the “physical laws” and the “social laws” that govern society and its 
evolution. For both natural and social sciences, the belief in the axiological neutrality of 
an approach to knowledge resulting from power struggles and value conflicts is imposed, 
stripped of any regulatory and speculative ambition, valuing experimentation as the 
                                               
* This work has been undertaken in the context of the International GERN Seminar (Groupe 
Européen de Recherches sur les Normativités) organized by Yves Cartuyvels (University of Saint-Louis – 
Bruxelles, Belgium) and Aniceto Masferrer (University of Valencia, Spain), and of the research project 
entitled “Las influencias extranjeras en la Codificación penal española: su concreto alcance en la Parte 
Especial de los Códigos decimonónicos” (ref. DER2016-78388-P), funded by the Spanish ‘Ministerio de 
Economía y Competitividad’ (2017-2020) and by the Groupe Européen de Recherches sur les Normativités 
(GERN) Interlabo (2019-2020). 
1 Foucault stated that truth should be understood no so much as “l’ensemble des choses vraies qu’il 
y a à faire découvrir ou à faire accepter, mais l’ensemble des règles selon lesquelles on démêle le vrai du 
faux” (Foucault, M., Entretiens avec Michel Foucault (1977), in Foucault, M., Dits et écrits, t. III : 1976-
1979, Paris, Gallimard, 1994, p. 160. 






unique source of knowledge, and aetiology (or the search for causes) as the foundation of 
the scientific approach. The concept of ‘common good’ disappeared.2 
 
In the social sciences, positivism is developed on the basis of two strong intuitions 
that significantly affect the birth and development of “positivist” criminology: on the one 
hand, there is an evolutionary view of the human species, strongly influenced by Charles 
Darwin's works and his Origin of Species, which, after its publication in 1859, breaks 
with an essentialist and abstract perspective on the human being. In the second half of the 
19th century, the idea that the human species is not unchanging, but rather that it evolves 
and adapts to its surroundings is widespread, whilst acknowledging phenomena of 
individual regression that produce “degenerates” in a “civilized world.” On the other 
hand, a sociological reading of social realities, thanks to the research of August Comte 
and Alphonse Quetelet, is aimed at mapping and providing statistics for social phenomena 
so that they can be better managed and controlled. A dual individual and social matrix is 
quickly imposed at the heart of positivism in the social sciences, in order to explain social 
and individual phenomena. It is based on a deterministic interpretation of human 
behaviour that radically questions the metaphysical assumptions of free will and 
responsibility. 
 
The influence of René Descartes is undeniable.3 The dichotomy between res 
cogitans and res extensa contributed to the emergence of thinkers who focus on the 
former – like Sartre, for whom man has an unrestricted freedom, –4 and others who focus 
on the latter – like Charles Darwin or Richard Dawkins, who mainly define and 
characterise man by his physical or biological dimensions.5 It goes without saying that 
there were other philosophers or thinkers who brought human dualism to its extreme 
consequences: Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud are probably the most 
representative figures whose influence is still undeniable today.6 Descartes is a rationalist, 
but his dualism (res cogitans – res extensa) paved the way for those who understood that 
the scientific method needed to be empirical (res extensa), and that even social sciences 
should adopt this method because otherwise they would be (dis)regarded as a mere 
                                               
2 On this matter, see Masferrer, A., “Criminal Law and Morality Revisited: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives”, Criminal Law and Morality in the Age of Consent: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Aniceto 
Masferrer, ed.), Dordrecht-Heidelberg-London-New York, Springer (Collection ‘Ius Gentium: 
Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice’), 2020, ch. 1. 
3 There is a connection between Descartes, Bacon, Comte and the rise of legal positivism of 19th 
century; on this matter, see for example, Weissman, D., “Positivism Reconsidered”, The Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy, New Series, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1994), pp. 1-19; see also Smithner, Eric W., “Descartes 
and Auguste Comte”, The French Review Vol. 41, No. 5 (Apr., 1968), pp. 629-640. As has been stated, 
“positivism also adopted René Descartes’s epistemology (i.e., theory of knowledge). Descartes believed 
that reason is the best way to generate knowledge about reality. His deductive method implies that events 
are ordered and interconnected, and therefore reality is ordered and deducible. This internal inconsistency 
eventually undermined the validity of “positivism” (http://personal.denison.edu/~kaboubf/Pub/2008-
Positivist-Paradigm). 
4 Franz Adler argues that the influence of phenomenologist epistemology led Sartre to think that 
“[m]an chooses and makes himself by acting. Any action implies the judgment that he is right under 
circumstances not only for the actor, but also for everybody else in similar circumstances” (“The Social 
Thought of Jean-Paul Sartre”, American Journal of Sociology 55, 3, Nov. 1949). 
5 Richard Dawkins affirms, for example, that “a mother is a machine for the optimal propagation 
of her genes”, and that “we are machines for survival, robots blindly prepared for the conservation of those 
selfish molecules that we call genes” (Das egoistische Gen, Berlin, 1978, pp. 145 and VIII; cited by 
Spaemann, R., Lo natural y lo racional, Madrid: Rialp, 1989, pp. 27-28). 
6 On this matter, see Masferrer, “Criminal Law and Morality Revisited: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives”, already cited. 






opinion, but not as a real science. Moreover, Descartes’ influence contributed to erect 
materialism (res extensa) and the mathematical method as the two relevant conditions for 
the advancement of science. This led the social sciences to adopt the method of the natural 
sciences. On the other hand, existentialism led to the opposite outcome: man needs to get 
rid of its limitations; the body (res extensa) is a limitation of the human mind or reason 
(res cogitans), so technology might enable man to overcome such physical or corporeal 
limitations. This leads to transhumanism.7 
 
On a social and political level, the end of the 19th century is marked by strong 
movements of social protest against the industrial revolution in several countries. The 
liberal constitutional state or “Police State” is in a crisis, incapable of responding 
effectively to the real inequalities, which the abstract principles of individual 
responsibility and formal equality of the liberal constitutional state do little to conceal. 
The fear of the “dangerous classes”8 and the threats of anarchism favour state intervention 
and encourage social reforms to avoid Revolution. As pointed out by the Belgian Adolphe 
Prins, the time has come for Capital to make concessions if the social order is to be 
maintained. Likewise, mainly in various European countries, a new insurance model of 
the social welfare state which carries different concepts of responsibility and risk stands 
out9, where logic merges with the new criminal science. 
 
Finally, from a legal point of view, the neat geometric constructions of legal 
positivism,10 which dominated the second half of the 19th century, are called into question 
by anti-formalist approaches in law. At the turn of the 20th century, new trends such as 
the sociological school in France, with Léon Duguit; sociological jurisprudence, with 
Roscoe Pound; or Legal Realism, with Oliver Wendell Holmes in the United States, 
emerge to place emphasis on an empirical approach to the study of law, which cannot be 
separated from its application. The object of study of the science of law has become “the 
law in the facts”, i.e. the law as a concrete reality as practiced in the courts, rather than a 
“law in the books”, that is, as an autonomous and geometrical system of rules built on 
abstract texts. Likewise, some of these progressive lawyers, such as Pound or Holmes, 
highlight the need to conceive the law, from now on, as “social engineering”, as a tool in 
the service of social transformation11. From a semantic point of view, the paradox is that 
at the birth of scientific positivism at the end of the 19th century, there is a crisis of legal 
positivism as seen by Kant, called in to give way or at least to be completed by an 
approach to law and jurisprudence that is more directly social. 
 
This evolution has a direct impact in the criminal field. Largely supported by 
contributions of scientific positivism, “criminal positivism” or “criminological 
                                               
7 The connection between Dawkins and thanshumanism has been even recognized by Nick 
Bostrom: “Many science advocates, such as Carl Sagan, Richard Dawkins, Steven Pinker, and Douglas 
Hofstadter, have also helped pave the way for public understanding of transhumanist ideas” (Bostrom, B., 
“The Tranhumanist FAQ: A General Introduction”, p. 12; available at 
https://www.nickbostrom.com/views/transhumanist.pdf). 
8 Pratt, J., Governing the dangerous: Dangerousness, law and Social change, Annandale, The 
Federation press, 1997.  
9 On this, see Ewald, Fr., The birth of Solidarity : The History of the French Welfare State, Duke 
University press, 2020.  
10 See the radical version proposed by H. Kelsen in his Pure Theory of Law (Bauyme S., Kelsen. 
Plaider la démocratie, Paris, Michalon, 2007).  
11 See Schwitters, R.J.S., Recht en Samenleving in verandering, Deventer, Kluwer, 2000, pp. 180-
185. 






positivism” shows the same mistrust of systematic and abstract constructions of the 
criminal law applicable in the 19th century. First represented by the Italian school of 
Lombroso, Ferri and Garofalo, to mention the most prominent figures, the “positivist 
protest” that marks the birth of criminology, denounces the metaphysical approach of the 
existing criminal law, its constitutive fictions, that is: free will, responsibility, and the 
refusal to envisage crime and criminals as social realities. The lax criminal discourse 
obsessed with Kantian retribution and oblivious to social interest is also criticized: “the 
sophism of the School of Law” lost in the meanderings of abstract and sophisticated 
constructions; the “new penology” opposes “the defence of society against ‘dangerous 
individuals’ who are also its ‘natural enemies’ as the priority for penalty12.  
 
With a clean break from the neoclassical criminal order that claims an empirical 
approach to the criminal question and how to address it, criminal or criminological 
positivism has a dual origin rooted in the history of social sciences in the 19th century. A 
first anthropological thread finds its source in the history of psychiatry, on the borders of 
crime and madness. Building upon the works of Lavater and Gall during the 19th century, 
influenced by the degeneracy discourse, a school of criminal anthropology is built on the 
idea of criminals as determined by their deep nature; degenerate beings marked by an 
atavism or by a biological anomaly. The psychiatrist Lombroso will take the lead of this 
biologising current, which singles out the criminal whose abnormality is seen on his 
body13. The second thread is sociological: represented by Ferri in Italy and, at times, 
excessively associated with the “French school” and Laccassagne, the Sociological 
School suggests a social interpretation of crime; placing emphasis on the effects that the 
surroundings have on committing a criminal act, without, however, denying the principle 
that the criminal has an anomaly (even if it is a moral one). A substantial part of the 
criminal debate at the end of the 19th century will be based on the opposition between 
these two approaches, a more biologising one and a more sociologising one, both of which 
seek to provide aetiological explanations for the commission of criminal acts and study 
solutions to the crime problem. By sharing a deterministic interpretation of man, these 
two contradictory and, at the same time, complementary threads within the same 
movement do not, however, draw the same conclusions regarding the response to crime. 
Depending on whether the criminogenic determinism is mainly linked to an action in a 
given context or to man’s very essence, the answer oscillates between integration and 
elimination, between preventive action and prophylaxis.  
 
It is in this triple context of epistemology, sociology and criminal law that the 
question arises of how legal or criminological positivism is not only received in Europe 
but also in Latin America, the geographical field of interest of our research. As 
highlighted above, this positivist discourse emerges in Italy in a more structured fashion 
before it is spread elsewhere14. Since 1876, the publication of the Uomo delinquente has 
marked the birth of criminal anthropology and has shifted the analysis of criminal science 
towards the criminal individual by explaining crimes based on factors of a biological 
                                               
12 Garofalo, R., La criminologie. Etude sur la nature du crime et la théorie de la pénalité, Paris, 
Alcan, 1888, p. X. 
13 Labadie, J.M., “Corps et crime. De Lavater (1775) à Lombroso (1876)”, in Debuyst Ch, Digneffe 
Fr., Labadie J.M., Pires A.P., Histoire des savoirs sur le crime & la peine, 1. Des savoirs diffus à la notion 
de criminel-né, Bruxelles-Montréal-Ottawa, De Boeck Université-PUM, PUO, 1995, pp. 293-346.  
14 On this regard, see Pifferi, M., Reinventing Punishment: A Comparative History of Criminology 
and Penology in the Ninenteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 






nature and especially on certain cranial defects specifically attributed to the criminal.15 
This biologising approach swiftly faced competition from a sociologising interpretation 
of crime which, mainly with Ferri, proposed a multi-causal theory of criminality. 
Criminals are thus presented as the result of anthropological, physical and social factors 
alike16. Even though positivism experiences a rapid success in Italy, the debate it stirs up 
in this country is quite representative of the tensions that quickly arise from a 
deterministic reading of crime. With the Tierza scuola, Lombrosianism is thereby called 
into question in the very country of its founding fathers from the start of the 1890s, and 
the quest for a third way, between the classical school’s principles, which are deemed 
obsolete, and the excesses of positivist determinism, takes shape.  
 
This search for a third way or of an “eclectic compromise” between criminal neo-
classicism and criminological positivism is without doubt one of the most significant 
markers of the debates which will immediately be taken abroad. The third way is at the 
forefront of the discussions which, from 1888 to 1913, will stir the congresses of the 
International Union of Penal Law (IUPL; UIDP in French; IKV in German). Founded in 
1888 by the German von Liszt, the Belgian Prins and the Dutchman van Hamel, and 
recording its resolutions at a series of international penal congresses, the IUPL is an 
important venue to discuss and spread positivist ideas. Gathering specialists from 
different countries, the Union offers a framework for debate where partisans of criminal 
classicism and members of the new positivist doctrine can interact. The former are 
concerned about maintaining the basic principles of criminality such as free will and 
criminal responsibility, the legality and proportionality of sentences or even the goals of 
retribution and deterrence. The latter endorsed determinism and irresponsibility, and 
insisted on the need to defend society against dangerous individuals by softening the basic 
principles of criminal law in order to prioritise social defence. Even though at the outset, 
the dogmas of criminal positivism and the reference to the Italian School make up the 
central message of the Union, over time the search for a compromise is placed at the 
forefront, to the point where Ferri believes that the Union has been “damaged in the limbo 
of eclecticism” 17. 
 
This quest for a third way is without doubt the dominating attribute of the 
orientations that define the reception of criminal or criminological positivism in several 
countries. This compromising path makes its way between the interest roused by 
numerous questions and analyses fuelled by the positivist thinkers of the Italian School 
and the resistance produced by a global project that is considered a menace to the rule of 
law. In several countries, this middle path will thus lead to a double-track system of 
sentences and measures with a Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft perspective. 
Complementing the legalistic foundations and the retributive purposes of the classical 
criminal law, preventive, reintegrating and safety measures emerge upstream and 
downstream of the sentence depending on the degree of dangerousness of the criminal 
and the crime.  
 
                                               
15 On the reception of Lombroso’s theories and the development of criminology in different 
countries, see Peter Becker and Richard F. Wetzell, Criminals and Their Scientists: The History of 
Criminology in International Perspective, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
16 Marchetti, P. , “De la responsabilité au risque. L’Ecole positive et les «nouveaux horizons» du 
droit pénal, Chronique de criminologie”, Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie, 2017, n. 6, pp. 562-585. 
17 Ferri, E., Sociologia criminale, Quarta edizione con due tavole grafiche, Torino, 1900, p. 53. 






The reception of criminal positivism at the end of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th century was not uniform. It underwent translation and reclaiming 
processes that depended on the specific social and cultural context of each country. At 
the end of the 19th century, Spain and Portugal did not have the same criminal debate as 
the Germanic world. Belgium or France, marked by the fear of social revolutions in the 
1880s and 1890s, are not the USSR after the October Revolution of 1917. If criminal 
positivism enters these and other countries, it is always in a specific context which inflects 
the reception of a movement of more general ideas. 
 
Our aim is to shed light on this “embedding” and “desembedding” 18 process in 
order to contribute to a more complete picture of the influence of criminal positivism on 
how crime was analysed and addressed at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries in Europe 
and Latin America. For the sake of clarity, we have decided to first present how the debate 
proceeded in Europe starting from its point of departure in Italy; we will then examine 
the role of the International Union of Penal Law whose action was crucial in spreading 
and discussing “new ideas”, before we contemplate how criminal positivism was received 
in different European countries. We shall then address the different contributions made 
to the discussion in Latin America, which are less well known to European readers, the 
reception of the positivist school in some American jurisdictions such as in Argentina and 
Brazil, a former Spanish territory and a Portuguese one, are also of great interest. A 
comparative approach to the reception of criminal positivism in Europe without 
addressing the issue in Latin America would be incomplete, as it would also require 
studying the Codification of criminal law. The context of both, the codification movement 
and the reception of criminal-law ideas, was not just European or Continental, but 
belonged to a much broader geographical scope: the Western world.19 
 
 





1. Social defence was a key notion of penal reformism and in particular of the 
Italian positive school founded by Enrico Ferri. It entailed a rethinking of the tenets of 
penal liberalism and was based on the idea that criminal law, rather than being targeted 
to the protection of individual rights, should be socially oriented to collective security. 
The legal consequences of this approach are examined in Pifferi’s essay. The choice of 
social defence as the rationale of punitiveness implied, in the positivist discourse, a 
rejection of free will as necessary condition of penal intervention and a 
reconceptualization of responsibility in purely legal terms apart from any moral 
consideration. Moreover, the rather vague notion of social dangerousness became the 
justification of punishment, raising doubts on its assessment criteria as well as on the 
prerogative of the body (judicial or administrative) charged of its evaluation. 
 
                                               
18 Melossi D., Sozzo, M., Sparks, R. (ed.), Travels of the Criminal Question. Cultural 
embeddedness and diffusion, Oñati International Series in Law and Society, Oxford and Portland Oregon, 
2011.  
19 Masferrer, A. (ed.), The Western Codification of Criminal Law: The Myth of the Predominant 
French Influence in Europe and America Revisited, Dordrecht-Heidelberg-London-New York, Springer 
(Collection ‘History of Law and Justice’), 2018. 






The individualization of punishment and criminal procedure, the great emphasis 
on prevention over repression, the need of adopting measures of social defence other than 
(and different from) traditional penalties were other arguments proposed by the Italian 
reformers, which were also deeply debated in international congresses. As Pifferi 
remarks, the revolutionary ideas proposed by adherents to the new school were not 
isolated, but were part of a broader reform movement. However, in Italy, the critical 
strength of penal positivism was not able to affect the legal system significantly. The 
Ferris’ Project of penal code, drafted in 1921, embedded all the positivists principles, but 
was never enacted due to cultural and political resistance. 
 
The issues of the legacy of positivism to fascist criminal law and of the influences 
of the 1921 Project on the 1930 Rocco code are still matters of historiographical debate. 
Even though Pifferi does not adhere to the continuity interpretation, nonetheless he shows 
how the tensions between the principle of social defence and individual safeguards 
survived the decline of the positive school and the fall of totalitarian regime and continued 
to characterize the Italian criminal law even after the enactment of the Constitution in 
1948. 
 
2. In Italy, the conflict initiated by the positivist school gives rise to the search for 
a third way. Promoted by Bernardo Alimena and Emanuele Carnevale, a “third school of 
criminal law” looks for an eclectic compromise between the excesses of the classical 
school, too absorbed in the abstract construction of the legal system and oblivious to the 
social reality of crime, on the one hand, and the excesses of the positivist school, enclosed 
in a naturalistic and “fatalistic” approach to crime as favoured by the Lombrosian theory 
of the born criminal, on the other hand.  
 
As emphasized by Stefano Vinci in his rich contribution dedicated to Bernardino 
Alimena and Emanuele Carnevale: the third school of criminal law searching for a 
compromise, the two most prominent representatives of the third school fight to impose 
their eclectic compromise on the Italian scene from the beginning of the 1890s. In doing 
so, they face a storm of criticism, especially from the positivist side, with which they 
shared several assumptions. According to the supporters of the positivist school, the 
programme of “critical positivism” defended by the third school, as set out in a Manifesto 
presented by Carnavale as early as 1891, was not particularly original and was based on 
unfounded or incorrect criticism. The biological fatalism, for which it reproached the 
positivist school, for example, is out of date, since positivists also insist on the importance 
of social factors as causes of crime; the importance of  undertaking social reforms in the 
fight against crime is interesting but had already been underlined by Ferri, whose theory 
on “criminal substitutes” and the “personality of criminal law” is criticised as a 
“scholastic concern”. In other words, the differences are minimal, although they 
sometimes provide useful critical assessments but are certainly insufficient to found a 
“new school”.  
 
In contrast, the option of a third school is better received on the European scene, 
where the reaction against Lombrosianism and the focus on the sociological approach to 
crime is in line with the orientations given by the International Union of Penal Law. 
Within the Union, Tarde, Gauthier or von Liszt give credit to the “third Italian school” 
for having underlined the predominance of social factors as causes of crime and for 
providing a “sociological perspective” to the study of crime. Vinci concludes that the 
theories of the third school were not so original when contextualised in Europe at the end 






of the 19th century, characterised by the decline of Lombroso’s doctrine. Still, such a 
discourse was courageous in Italy at the time, in a national context that was largely 
dominated by the representatives  of the positivist school, where some of its members did 
not hesistate to add Alimena and Carnaval to the list of a “mollusc variety of eclectic 
criminalists” (Ferri). 
 
3. The discussion initiated by the positivist school in Italy rapidly spread to the 
international scene. Amongst other initiatives, the International Penitentiary Congresses 
(1846-1950) and the meetings of the International Union of Penal Law (1889-1913) 
played a significant role in the dissemination of positivist ideas and their corresponding 
discussions. In their contribution “The Argentina participation in the International 
Penitentiary Congresses (1872-1950)”, Esteban González and Jorge Núñez analyse the 
role played by the Argentinian delegates in the international penal and penitentiary 
exchanges. The framework for this analysis, though, is much more complex as it involves 
the mechanisms of international relations belonging to a specific sphere of knowledge, 
the importance of the International Penitentiary Congress for public policy planning, and 
the difficulties that emerging governments faced in their efforts to engage in sustained 
diplomatic relations of a scientific nature during this period. From early on, Argentina 
demonstrated interest not only in participating in the International Penitentiary Congress, 
but also in importing knowledge on penal systems.  
 
But changing local circumstances conditioned Argentina’s participation in the 
successive iterations of the event, which in turn meant different levels of commitment to 
the discussions that were held therein. Argentina’s participation in the congress from 1872 
up to 1950 can be divided into three categories: 1) participation of Argentinian experts in 
the penal and penitentiary question, as is the case for the congresses in Washington 
(1910), London (1925) and The Hague (1950); 2) participation by members of the 
diplomatic corps who had no ties or experience in the prison field – or, if they did, their 
participation was not noteworthy (for example, in Stockholm (1878), Rome (1885), Saint 
Petersburg (1890) and Brussels (1900) –; and 3) an outright absence, such as at the 
congresses in London (1872), Paris (1895) and Budapest (1905).  
 
The contribution tries to cover a long period of almost a century and has therefore 
been divided into two parts: 1872-1905 and 1910-1950. The temporal division is not 
arbitrary, but linked to a new concern of the Argentine State to have a strong presence in 
these international scientific meetings by assigning the best experts. The article is based 
mainly on two primary sources: the documents available at the Historical Archive of the 
Argentine Foreign Office and the references to Argentina in the records of the 
International Penal and Penitentiary Congress, which for a number of years have been 
made almost fully available at the École Nationale d’administration Pénitentitaire’s 
digital archive. The authors also reviewed secondary sources such as the reports of the 
Ministry of Justice and Education and the publications issued in Argentina on the 
country’s participation in various editions of the International Penitentiary Congress. 
Finally, in an attempt to join the national and international levels, González and Núñez 
give an account of Argentine political and social developments, especially in the 
penitentiary field, during the period in question (prison reforms, the construction of model 
establishments, the Criminal Code sanction, the import of criminological ideas, etc.). In 
short, this thoroughly documented article intends to raise an issue that rarely receives 
attention for Argentine prison historiography. In addition, it contributes to historical 






studies about on international relations, diplomatic exchanges and expert knowledge of 
networking technologies.  
 
4. In his contribution, “About the concept of the ‘dangerous individual’ in turn-
of-the-century penal reform: Debates on recidivism, état dangereux, indeterminate 
sentencing, and civil liberty in the International Union of Penal Law, 1889-1914,” 
Richard Wetzell continues the examination of international networks and organizations 
as a crucial arena of the penal reform movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. Alluding to Michel Foucault’s famous article on the “concept of the ‘dangerous 
individual’ in 19th-century legal psychiatry” in its title,20 Wetzell’s article begins with an 
overview of the founding of the International Union of Penal Law (IUPL) – Union 
Internationale de Droit Pénal (UIDP) in French, Internationale Kriminalistische 
Vereinigung (IKV) in German – by three professors of criminal law (the German Franz 
von Liszt, the Belgian Adolphe Prins and the Dutchman Gerard Anton van Hamel), the 
Union’s penal reform agenda, and the major topics discussed at its congresses. In its 
central sections, the article provides a close examination and analysis of the IUPL’s 
debates, at its international congresses from 1889 to 1913, on arguably the most central 
issue in the penal reform agenda pursued by the IUPL and its founders, namely, how to 
treat recidivists, “incorrigible habitual criminals” or “dangerous” criminals (the 
terminology varied over time), and the closely related debates over indefinite security 
detention and indeterminate sentencing as the preferred remedies for dealing with such 
“dangerous” criminals.  
 
In analyzing the patterns of argumentation in these debates as well as their 
development over time, the article develops three arguments. First, it demonstrates that 
even though critical voices regularly called the existence of “incorrigible” criminals as 
well as the concept of “dangerousness” (état dangereux) into question, the IUPL’s 
leadership continued to press for aggressive measures against a target group of repeat 
offenders that remained ill defined. In this respect, therefore, the debates reveal the 
IUPL’s utter failure to live up to its promise of basing penal policy on empirical 
criminological and penological research. Second, the article reveals that civil liberty 
concerns played an important role within the IUPL by showing that prominent members 
repeatedly and eloquently objected that subjective criteria for “dangerousness” and 
indeterminate sentencing posed serious threats to individual freedom. As the author 
explains, these critical voices came mostly – although not exclusively – from IUPL 
members from two countries: Third-Republic France, where political culture was infused 
with the legacy of the French Revolution and where the transportation of multiple 
recidivists to penal colonies obviated the need for indefinite detention at home, and 
Tsarist Russia, where liberal jurists were experiencing the dangers of arbitrary state power 
at first hand. Finally, the article carefully analyzes the role of the three IUPL founders in 
these debates in order to offer a nuanced comparison of the penal reform agendas of Liszt, 
van Hamel, and Prins, from which, in most respects, van Hamel emerges as the most 
radical reformer among the three. While Prins was initially the most moderate (rejecting 
indeterminate sentences), over time his push for aggressive measures of social defense 
almost completely displaced his civil liberty concerns; Liszt, the author argues, occupied 
a middle position between his co-founders. 
 
                                               
20 Foucault, M., “About the Concept of the ‘Dangerous Individual’ in 19th-Century Legal 
Psychiatry,” International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 1 (1978), pp. 1–18. 






5. In his contribution on Zweckgedanke, Social Defence and Transnational 
Criminal Law: Franz von Liszt and the Network of Positivist Criminology (1871-1918), 
Karl Härter examines the influence of Franz von Liszt (1851-1919) on the construction 
of criminological positivism at the end of the 19th century in a context marked by a 
strongly intertwined national and international context. In Germany, the “Franz von Liszt-
Schule” proposed a new gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (integrated criminal law 
science), inspired by a utilitarian perspective (the Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht) that 
clearly distanced itself from the theoretical and retributive approach of the liberal classical 
criminal school. But what Härter emphasizes is that such a new integrated approach to 
criminal science, already prepared in Germany decades before by a criminological 
discourse before it officially came into existence, developed in close connection with the 
international discussion on positivism. To be sure, as a founder of the International Union 
of Penal Law (IUPL/UIDP/IKV) along with Prins and van Hamel, von Liszt created an 
intermediary structure between international criminology and German jurisprudence, 
avoiding a direct doctrinal clash between national schools of thoughts. But he mainly 
contributed to the discussion and dissemination of his gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft at 
an international level and thus encouraged the transnationalisation of criminological 
positivism. On this note, one of Härter’s conclusions is that von Liszt’s impact was less 
on national legislation, but rather concerned the internationalisation of criminal policy, 
social defence and the Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht.   
 
A main interest of Härter’s analysis in that respect is the choice to examine central 
concepts of von Liszt’s integrated law science, such as dangerousness  
(Gemeingefährlichkeit) and social defence, given the discussions they generated at the 
various congresses of the IUPL. Closer to Ferri’s social explanation of crime than to 
Lombrosian endogenic approach, even if he did not fully reject the role of anthropological 
factors as causes of crime, von Liszt focuses on social dangerousness (and not only 
recidivism) as the key driver of punishment and favours the use of a dual-track system of 
judicial punishment – indefinite preventive and subsequent security measures – to combat 
crime. On those issues, von Liszt’s and his followers’ perspectives are adopted by the 
IUPL, which enables Härter to write that the IUPL (in German: IKV) “approved concepts 
and narratives which other crucial figures of German positivist criminology and von 
Listz’s network (…) propagated to some extent”.  
 
However, the transnational dimension of von Listz’s work is not only theoretical. 
Härter underlines that, according to von Liszt, the concepts of dangerousness and social 
defence also involve international crime issues such as anarchism - probably under the 
influence of Lombroso’s book Gli anarchici (1894) - or trafficking in women and 
transnational Zweckstrafen such as transportation and extradition. Once more, the 
discussion reached the IUPL, in an attempt to develop the transnational dimension of 
Strafrechtswissenschaft on concrete international issues. However, von Liszt was less 
successful in this instance, even if some of his proposals (on extradition, for instance) 
would be endorsed years after his death. 
 
6. In Belgium, A. Prins played a central role in the dissemination of criminal 
positivism. An eclectic thinker, Prins was also an enlightened reformer who intervened 
in the political, social and penal arenas. Professor at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, an 
adherent of the progressive movement based on positivism that dominated at this 
university with the "School of Brussels", Prins quickly understood the need for social 
reforms to safeguard the existing political system: if the bourgeoisie wished to maintain 






the social order and avoid the temptation of revolution, it had to make concessions to the 
working classes. In the turbulent context of the final decades of the 19th century, Prins 
positioned himself as a defender of the burgeoning social welfare state and as a promoter 
of the insurance logic that characterises it. Author of numerous contributions in social, 
labour and constitutional law, he also promoted various social reforms aimed at protecting 
the rights of the more vulnerable classes of the population.  
 
In a world where the boundaries between the working classes to be integrated, and 
a deviant sub-proletariat to be controlled are blurred, Prins drafts an integrated criminal 
science project complementing the labour and social reforms. By transferring into 
criminal law the risk logic that was developing in civil law, Prins proposed to fill the gaps 
of the classical criminal law with social defence laws at the edges of the system for 
“dangerous” persons who slipped through the cracks of the social net.  
 
Influenced by the discussion initiated in Italy by Lombroso, Ferri and Garofalo, 
co-founder with von Liszt and van Hamel of the International Union of Criminal Law, 
Prins was an eclectic thinker, always searching for a third way between extremes. Critical 
of the metaphysical (mis)conceptions of the neoclassical school, he was also suspicious 
of the excesses of the positivist project. Its influence on the penal scene in Belgium was 
decisive: at the crossroad between law and politics, Prins is at the origin of a dual track 
system, initiating numerous laws based on positivist principles which still complement 
the Penal Code of 1867 today. He also called for a reform of the penitentiary system and 
introduced the principle of a gradual system that includes suspended sentences and 
conditional release. A social reformer, Prins imposed his reform project on the penal 
scene in the name of the very same priority: maintaining social order.  
 
7. In the Netherlands, the influence of criminal positivism or criminological 
positivism is inevitably linked to the figure of G.A. van Hamel (1842-1917). Professor of 
criminal law at the University of Amsterdam, one of the founding fathers of the 
“Tijdschrift voor Strafrecht”, van Hamel was also a member of the “Liberal Unie”, a 
centrist political party defending moderate social reforms, and active in the field of 
healthcare and juvenile protection in Amsterdam. As John Vervaele explains, van Hamel 
resembled Prins in Belgium, “a perfect combination in personam of law and politics”. As 
Vervaele’s contribution relates, van Hamel started as a rather conservative lawyer, 
adhering to the (neo)classical school of which the 1886 Dutch penal code is still the 
expression. It is from 1880 onwards that van Hamel begins to adopt a more critical view 
of the dogmatic and metaphysical approach of the dominant criminal law discourse in the 
Netherlands, influenced by his liberal philosophical background (the doctrine of the libre 
examen) and a secular ethical approach of Law. Like Prins in Belgium, his interest in 
social reform guides him towards an approach to crime as a “real fact” and not only as a 
pure juridical abstraction, a change that becomes more solid when, in 1884, he discovered 
the “Marburger Programm, der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht” published by von Liszt. 
Participating in various international congresses, especially in those organized by the 
International Penitentiary Commission and the International Congresses of Criminal 
Anthropology, van Hamel is strongly impressed by the “gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft” 
proposed by von Liszt as well as by “Criminalité et repression. Essai de science pénale” 
published by Prins in 1886. Sharing with those two prominent scholars the project of a 
new goal-oriented criminal policy, based on scientific statements and aimed at protecting 
the society against crime, he joined them to create the International Union of Penal Law 
(IUPL/UIDP/IKV) in 1889.  







However, what makes the analysis of van Hamel's thinking more difficult is that, 
unlike von Liszt or Prins, he never completed an elaborated theoretical penal project and 
that most of his ideas are to be traced back to scattered texts and contributions which may 
be compared to his main publication, a Manual on Dutch Criminal Law, whose second 
edition published in 1907 is dedicated to Prins and von Liszt.  Proposing a chronological 
approach, Vervaele shows van Hamel’s interest in classic themes of criminological 
positivism including criticism of the dogmatism of the classical school (Carrara), the 
promotion of social defence as a priority, a classification of criminals based on their social 
dangerousness and possible reintegration (or lack thereof), as well as a dual track system 
of sanction supported by legal punishment and indefinite sentences for the “customary 
incorrigibles”. Two particularities can be underlined from this list: the first being an 
interest in white-collar criminals, whom van Hamel seeks to include in his typology; and 
the second being, like Lombroso and von Liszt, a focus on “anarchist terrorism,” whose 
violence is seen as a threat for “the pacific evolution of social institutions”.  
 
To conclude, Vervaele states that, if clearly influenced by the evolutionary 
perspective endorsed by the Italian school, van Hamel nevertheless remained “a rather 
conservative reformer” when compared to Prins or von Liszt. It seems hard to drawn a 
line in a very eclectic work, where the relationship between social defence goals and 
general principles of criminal law remain “in the dark”. Although interested in the new 
horizons of criminological positivism, van Hamel’s eclecticism probably reflects the need 
to embed the criminological positivistic inputs in a dogmatic criminal law that he never 
abandoned.  
 
8. Austria represents an interesting case that has largely been neglected by 
criminal law historians up until now. Yet, as a territory characterised by a “high cross-
border mobility” at the end of the 19th century, the Habsburg Empire experienced an 
important scientific in- and out-migration of scholars that amplifies the resonance in 
Austria of the debate between the “classical school” and the new positivist criminology 
that flourished in Germany. After having underlined the role of the International Union 
of Penal Law and the part taken by the Austrian representatives of both fields in the IUPL, 
Schennach’s contribution emphasizes the eclectic nature of the discussion in Austria, as 
illustrated by the creation of several scientific journals open to representatives of the two 
schools. Followers of von Liszt such as Vargha, Gross, Lammasch or Stooss remain 
prudent or ambivalent and never directly attack the representatives of the classical school 
who remain dominant in the country. Among the followers who are more or less 
convinced by the new conception of crime and criminal as “social fact”, the concept of 
free will seems sometimes difficult to forsake, as well as general and special prevention 
or “retaliation” goals of punishment. Suspended sentences and conditional release, on the 
one hand, indefinite sentences, on the other hand, also raise ethical questions. And the 
reflection on crime and criminal, in Vargha’s writing, for example, sometimes shows 
constructivist accents that sound closer to a Durkheimian or even interactionist 
perspective than the realist or naturalist etiological criminology of the time. 
 
All in all, as Schennach underlines, the followers of von Liszt’s ideas were never 
real Doppelgänger, in a debate where “von Liszt adversaries significantly outnumbered 
his adherents”. Among those, Hugo Hoegel did not conceal his deep antipathy for the new 
school of thought that “threatens the fundament of science of criminal law”. An advocate 
of the free will theory, a supporter of the retributive and deterrent functions of 






punishment, Hoegel rejected any kind of determinism and criticised the key element in a 
project to reduce punishment to a purely utilitarian tool. Among others, his warnings 
against the dangers of a system endorsing preventive custody, protective incarceration 
without the requirement of a penal act or the categorising of criminals are illustrative of 
the gap that may separate the two schools. Perhaps more so than in other countries, the 
Austrian debate illustrates the areas of tension that exist in the penal discussion at the time 
between a neoclassical approach based on Kant and a utilitarian perspective that could 
possibly be correlated to Bentham’s legacy21. 
 
9. Still in the German sphere of influence, social defence ideas, inspired by the 
Italian school and von Liszt, were of crucial importance in the drafting of a national Swiss 
Penal Code in 1937. From the 1870s onwards, critical voices of a positivist stripe question 
the foundations of a liberal criminal law that was endorsed by most of the existing 
cantonal codes and cross-fertilised the efforts of those who seek to create a national 
criminal code. Under the impetus of Carl Stoos (and also Emil Zürcher), such efforts 
result in the drafting of a 1937 Criminal code “inspired by and strongly committed to a 
social defence perspective that sought to address crime by using scientific expertise and 
individualized sanctions”.   
 
As Urs German explains, the criminal law reform in Switzerland adopts a “dual-
track system”, with a set of security and treatment measures for “abnormal” or/and 
dangerous criminals (recidivists, mentally-impaired offenders, juvenile delinquents) that 
complement the regular penalties system based on classical principles (proportionality) 
and objectives. Such a dual-track option, not especially original in the social defence 
perspective, as Ferri in Italy or Prins in Belgium had already considered them years 
before, also introduced conditional sentencing, probation or warning for the “occasional” 
offenders whose rehabilitation is to be encouraged.  
 
In a country characterised by a complete absence of criminology as an academic 
discipline, penal reform follows a pragmatic path, resulting in a compromise between the 
new social defence ideals and the existing criminal law. From the outset, reform efforts 
were indeed criticised by representatives of a conservative wing, probably more 
concerned with maintaining a retributive criminal law than anxious to defend the rights 
and freedoms threatened by the sécuritaire ideology of social defence. “To reform 
without a revolution” was the aim, in a project that was nevertheless influenced by a 
growing risk-oriented conception of deviance and an attempt to integrate the penal law 
project in a broader social policy. 
 
10. France is often presented as a place of resistance to the theses of the Italian 
Criminogical School. Founded by Alexandre Lacasagne, the “School of Lyon” is 
supposed to have proposed a sociological reading of the causes of crime, offering an 
alternative to the biologistic approach of the Italian School. In her contribution, Martine 
Kaluszinski shows us that the reality is more complex.  
 
From the very beginning, Lombroso's works appear in French medical circles and 
Alexandre Lacassagne, for instance, also knew his “Lombrosian temptation”. It is only at 
                                               
21 On Bentham as precursor of a “Criminal Safety Law”, see Jung, A.,  Jeremy Bentham et les 
mesures de sûreté en droit actuel: Suisse et Belgique, Genève, Zurich, Bâle, Schulthess Médias Juridiques, 
2008.   






the International Congress of Criminal Anthropology in 1885 that Lacassagne openly 
expressed his criticism. Emphasizing that criminal anthropology was rooted in a French 
background (Gall's phrenology and the degeneration theory elaborated by Morel), 
Lacassagne prudently questions core notions of Lombrosianism such as atavism and 
fatalism in order to stress the “social milieu” as the principal cause of crime. Without 
totally rejecting any biological determinism, Lacassagne restrains the importance it has 
by explaining  that the criminal  is “a microbe” that “only matters the day it finds the 
broth that ferments it”, i.e. a social milieu that brings a person to turn to crime. Introducing 
a social perspective on crime, Lacassagne could also underline the importance of social 
responsibility in the production of crime.  
 
But the “resistance” to Lombrosianism and more largely to the Italian School 
perspectives also rose among legal experts. Important scholars including Gabriel Tarde, 
Alexandre Saleilles or Camois de Vince resist the new ideas and methodology of the 
criminological school. On the one hand, the denial of free will and responsibility is 
perceived as a danger for the entire penal system and even for the moral principles on 
which society is built. On the other hand, the new Italian doctrine threatens the 
fundamental principles of the criminal law system. Analysing at length the positions of 
Tarde or Dubuisson, Kaluszinsky shows to what extent the questions of free will and 
responsibility play a key role in the position of the French lawyers who share a common 
mistrust towards the theories of criminal irresponsibility. 
 
Such a resistance does not allow us to conclude how innocuous the Italian school’s 
influence was in France at the end of the 19th century. The will to maintain a “Republican 
criminal law” does not prevent the passage of a law on relegation for multiple recidivists 
in 1885, whose emergence is clearly of “positivist” inspiration. But if notions such as 
danger and prevention spread in the modern criminal law, as elsewhere in Europe, the 
anthropological legacy was infused more broadly in theoretical medical circles (with 
debates on eugenics, for example) than in legal or penitentiary practices. 
 
11. In dealing with “The reception of the positivist school in the Spanish criminal 
doctrine (1885-1899) ”, Masferrer makes clear from the beginning of his article that the 
Spanish criminal-law science of the 19th century remained generally faithful to an eclectic 
position until the end of that century, halfway between the classical school (Beccaria, 
Lardizábal) and the new positivist theories that emerged in the last third of the 19th century 
coming from Italy (Lombroso, Ferri, Garofalo) and other European jurisdictions such as 
France (Lacassagne, Aubry, Magnan, Feré), Germany (Krause, Röder, Kurella, Baer, 
Naecke), Belgium (Prins, Dallemagne, Moureau, Bidez, Semal), etc. In this regard, the 
main Spanish criminal lawyers (Joaquín Francisco Pacheco, Alejandro Groizard y Gómez 
de la Serna, Tomás María de Vizmanos, Cirilo Álvarez Martínez, and so forth), as well 
as the vast majority of professors and teachers who taught criminal law courses in Spanish 
universities at the end of the century, adhered to the postulates of the classical –or rather 
neoclassical– school, giving some relevance to certain aspects of utilitarianism, as did 
some of the leading French experts in criminal law who defended this eclecticism (Rossi, 
Tissot, and Ortolan). 
 
However, Spanish criminal doctrine was fully aware of the existence of the new 
theories and that they had their defenders. In 1898, Constancio Bernaldo de Quirós 
published a book entitled Las nuevas teorías de la criminalidad (Madrid: Hijos de Reus). 
He was the criminal lawyer most convinced of the bounties of the positivist school. 






Despite this relevant work, Masferrer shows how the positivist school in Spain never 
constituted “a compact and definite nucleus”: not many lawyers carried out rigorous 
studies defending the Italian positivist school. Besides Rafael Salillas, who was a doctor 
and a criminologist apart from being a lawyer, the author explores the eclectic figure of 
Dorado Montero –more correctionalist and ‘social defender’ than representative of the 
positivist school–, the “critical positivism” of César Silió –who abandoned the topic after 
publishing La crisis del derecho penal–, and Bernaldo de Quirós –who might be 
considered as the criminal lawyer most committed to Criminal Anthropology–. Masferrer 
also analyses other authors who were somewhat critical of the Nuova Scuola: Aramburu, 
Silvela, Amor y Naveiro, Arredondo, and Bravo Goyena. Among them, Aramburu’s 
criticism was the most rigorous one, respected and influential, probably because, leaving 
aside his prestige as a criminal law expert and Chancellor of his university; he was able 
to carry out –in his Nueva ciencia penal– a brilliant presentation and, at the same time, a 
consistent critique. 
 
Masferrer concludes that while it is true that positivism had a strong impact in 
Spain towards the end of the 19th century, critical stances predominated. The author 
suggests that this might not have changed at the beginning of the 20th century. 
 
12. The article by José Franco-Chasán focuses on characterising Dorado Montero 
and stressing his highly prominent, transitional character. Having lived between two 
centuries (19th and 20th) and between two hugely predominant schools (the Neoclassical 
and the Positivist ones) endowed him with a very critical assessment of the main 
European doctrinal trends. Thus, he shed some light on the reigning confusion and on 
oversimplifying schemes which took place in the course of those centuries. The criminal 
lawyer from Salamanca enjoyed a renowned prestige and provided wise academic 
guidance (praised by some national and international scholars, such as Jiménez de Asúa, 
Welzel, Bernaldo de Quirós, Mezger, Álvarez-Buylla or Antón Oneca himself). 
Sometimes labelled as an ‘eclectic’, he clearly falls into his own, indeterminate sphere 
with a sui generis positioning within the doctrine. It has been spotted between ‘critical 
positivism’ (or Vaccaro’s Terza Scuola) and what we may call a ‘positivist 
correctionalism’. His main strength, though, lies in his intellectual capacity of 
determining every nuance in the transition from the Neoclassical School to the Positivist 
Schools. Even if it might seem like an oxymoron at first, Dorado Montero possessed an 
outstanding knowledge of the neoclassical postulates, as well as an exceptional ability to 
pinpoint its state of the art. On the contrary, as some other authors often assert, it does not 
simply mean that in Spain the traditional Neoclassical School won the battle over 
positivism, but that the Neoclassical School changed on its own. He identified that even 
the neo-classicists were thinking in terms of the new positivist common ground, and also 
found that there was a more general swift to a new positivist-shared scenario (yet with 
their differences between the schools), rather than a battle of two different schools in two 
completely different environments. 
 
Franco-Chasán’s article addresses the creation and articulation of such complex 
thought in which several sciences and often opposed aspects (such as his initial faith and 
his latter, tired atheism) were set. The article aims to have an introductory character, 
because understanding Dorado Montero and his many sharp edges is quite complex. For 
this, seven main components influencing and shaping his understanding were considered, 
namely: Christian views, relativism, positivism, Krausism, socialism, anarchism and 
sociology. That concatenation of influences has a direct influx on two topics which were 






his main concerns: the existence/absence of free will and the rationale for legal 
responsibility. Indeed, within Dorado Montero’s approach, as one will observe, his core 
thought matches the two aforementioned fundamental aspects upon which Criminal law 
is founded. 
 
13. The article by Pedro Caeiro and Frederico de Lacerda da Costa Pinto aims to 
assess the impact of positivism on Portuguese criminal law. For this purpose, the authors 
carry out a characterisation of the legal context around 1880 which, due to particular 
political circumstances, finds its roots back in the liberal revolution and the Constitution 
of 1822. Between those temporal benchmarks, two trends emerge which, despite their 
different genealogies, play a complementary rather than an antithetical role: on the one 
hand, the consolidation of the ideals of the Enlightenment and the liberal program 
inherent in the paradigm of the Neoclassical School; on the other hand, the progressive 
concern with special prevention. The former led to a consistent call for the humanisation 
of the sanctioning system, with the abolition of cruel and infamous penalties (and later, 
the death penalty and all lifelong sentences, including imprisonment and relegation), 
together with the reform of prison facilities and the enforcement regime. The latter trend 
focused on special prevention and rehabilitation through the penitentiary system and 
would gain momentum with correctionalism and by importing the works of Roeder and 
Krause. Caeiro and Costa Pinto argue that, to a certain extent, correctionalism has 
prepared (and in some cases anticipated) the emergence of positivism, by furthering an 
organicist view of society and shifting the focus of penal intervention from the criminal 
offence to the offender. 
 
The authors point out that the reception of positivism in Portuguese law was part 
of a much wider cultural movement with strong political ties, due to the close connection 
with republicanism and its endeavour to create a new, modern social order. Their analysis 
of the influence of positivism on criminal law and criminal justice covers three 
dimensions: the research and practice of scientists (in particular, doctors and alienists); 
the theory and teaching of criminal law (in particular, at the university); and legislative 
and institutional action in the field of criminal justice (particularly in the enforcement of 
sanctions). Scientists clearly took the lead in the adoption of the positivist programme 
and furthered a brand new perspective in the realm of criminal justice: crime and 
offenders are not a ‘metaphysical’ topic, but rather a pragmatic nuisance that requires an 
effective response by the state, which in turn, can only be based on true knowledge of the 
phenomenon. As a consequence, it is necessary to study the endogenous (bio-psychic) or 
exogenous (social) causes of criminality through the experimental method, so that they 
are positively identified and can be successfully countered. However, positivism had a 
modest impact on the research and teaching of Portuguese criminal law. Few scholars 
embraced the positivist program fully and their influence did not last long. Nevertheless, 
mainstream academia has assimilated some of its elements, namely concerning the 
usefulness of a sociological approach to crime and the revision of the theoretical 
framework applicable to unaccountable and dangerous offenders. The same topics have 
caught the interest of the public bodies responsible for drafting and reforming criminal 
justice, and a series of legal mechanisms and institutions were directly inspired by 
positivism. Some of them lasted for a long time, as they were shown to be useful for the 
dictatorship (1926-1974) to manage certain social groups.   
 
Caeiro and Costa conclude that, despite its powerful rise in the scientific field, 
positivism had a limited and quite specific influence on Portuguese criminal law. 






However, it did not substantially alter the theoretical structures inherited from the 
Neoclassical School, nor did it permanently modify the rehabilitative ideal brought about 
by the prison system, which remains a resilient feature of Portuguese criminal law. 
 
14. In Europe, the reception of criminological positivism is particularly interesting 
in the Soviet Union after the October Revolution of 1917. As evidenced by Maria Filatova 
in her contribution on the “Reception of social defence in the RSFSR and the USSR”, 
early 20th century Russian criminal law doctrine was very much influenced by the 
sociological criminal law school, and the revolution of 1917 allowed even the most 
extreme positivist concepts to become part of the law, at least for a while. 
 
In the first years after the Revolution, revolutionary lawyers insisted on creating 
a new legal system, which was totally different in all aspects from the old one, opposing 
and excluding the latter. The attempts of the revolutionary authority to get rid of any signs 
of imperial law gave rise to discussions on the content of a Soviet criminal law 
definitively cleared of the former “bourgeois law” and designed to defend the new 
socialist system. The greatest struggle was carried out by N.V. Krylenko, who took an 
extremely critical approach to the former law of the imperial regime. Being responsible 
for revolutionary tribunals and later working as prosecutor, Krilenko played an important 
role in the reception of positivist ideas in the RSFSR and later in the USSR, insisting on 
instituting the concept of dangerousness of the person and a class approach to punishment. 
As can be seen from the first revolutionary legal acts and the definitions of crimes therein, 
the criminal law of that first period after the Revolution (1917-1922) focused on the 
protection of the new social order and the interests of leading classes (proletariat and 
peasantry). Many social defence concepts seemed to be quite convenient for founding the 
new criminal law: replacement of guilt by dangerousness, admission of legal analogy in 
criminal law, the rejection of retribution as the basis and measure of the response to 
deviance, social defence measures instead of punishment were some of the most explicit 
signs of the positivist heritage. 
 
As a consequence of this radical revolutionary-positivist turn, some important and 
basic principles of criminal law were excluded. However, most of them, such as guilt or  
“revolutionary legality,” were restored soon after and, by the end of the 1920s, the main 
fundaments of a pure revolutionary criminal law, based on Marxist philosophy and 
influenced by a sociological approach of criminal law, were less noticeable. Nevertheless, 
concludes Filatova, it would be unfair to deny the role played by criminal positivism in 
the Soviet legislation as it drew attention to the social factors of crime and to the 
importance of the criminal as a “real person” influenced by their environment and not as 
a pure abstraction in the liberal criminal law tradition. 
 
 
2.2. Latin America 
 
15. In their contribution “Ascension and decline of positivism in Argentina”, 
Enrique Roldán Cañizares and Matías J. Rosso analyse the reception of the positivist 
school in Argentina. Since the mid-1880s, some glimpses of the reception of the discourse 
“in the name of science” on the criminal issue can be observed from theoretical 
developments by Cesare Lombroso and his disciples. The fact that positivism began to 
permeate the Argentinian intelligentsia during this particular period and only in a 
university context, was no coincidence. From the 1880s onwards, Argentina experienced 






one of the most notable periods of economic growth, which meant the opening up of the 
young country. A new world was opening for the Argentinian nation, and with it came 
new ideas from all corners of the globe. Thus, by 1885, some researchers had begun their 
studies of ‘criminal anthropology’ at the insane asylum in the city of Buenos Aires. 
Imbued with the new doctrine, the University of Buenos Aires took another step forward, 
creating the Society of Legal Anthropology in 1888: an institution that became a new and 
powerful advocate of the positivist current, where the first works under the influence of 
the positivist teachings in Argentina began to see the light. All of their works were clearly 
influenced by the thoughts of Lombroso, Ferri and Spencer, and the French school, while 
Spanish positivists were not even taken into consideration. Nevertheless, and despite this 
Spanish absence, Argentinian authors and thinkers were recognised and valued in 
international academic circles. 
  
The ideas of positivist criminology produced in the European context quickly 
spread and were debated in the fields of medicine and law, giving rise to a rapid process 
of cultural importation of these specific ways of thinking about the criminal issue. 
Positivist criminology quickly became a discourse of authority, both in academia and in 
politics. However, the importation of these views was not absolute. They were nuanced 
depending on the readings that Argentinian intellectuals made of them. Many postulates 
were accepted without discussion, while others were reformed and even suppressed from 
both academic and political discourse. 
  
Nevertheless, most researchers have focused on the influence of positivism in the 
intellectual and university environment, the importance that the Italian current acquired 
soon after setting foot in the Rio de la Plata being undeniable. However, the expansion of 
ideas among privileged minds is of no use if they do not find accommodation in legal 
texts. The reality is that positivism ended up disappearing in Argentina. The passing of 
the years and the impossibility of applying a truly positivist system caused a decrease in 
the support of the Italian doctrine in Argentina, until it practically disappeared. One might 
wonder whether positivism had no real impact in Argentina during its golden age. The 
truth is that while its legislative impact was practically nil, some contributions within the 
scope of prison reform are noticeable. Did positivism triumph in Argentina to the point 
of transforming criminal law and Argentine society itself? Not at all, and the author 
describes the reasons that explain this phenomenon. 
 
16. In his article, Ricardo Sontag shows how Brazilian historiography has often 
discussed the “influence” of the scuola positiva in Brazil between the end of the 19th 
century and the first decades of the 20th century. Outside Brazil, many analogous studies 
have also been carried out: if it is a peripheral country, the emphasis usually falls on 
influence; if it is a central country (in this case, Italy), the emphasis usually falls on its 
twin concept: diffusion. More recently, there has been research that has tried to avoid the 
unidirectional tendency and the lack of precision of the concept of influence/diffusion. 
The historiographical critique against unidirectional analysis of cultural relationships that 
has been growing in the last decades invites us to follow this kind of path. Yet, it is a 
methodological challenge to withdraw from unidirectional depictions when one of the 
legal cultures analysed tended to act as a simple reception pole (the Brazilian legal 
culture) and the other one (the Italian legal culture), as a diffusion pole.  
 
Even so, Sontag intends to experiment with some new methodological ways of 
analysing such a situation withdrawing from unidirectional depictions. Then, in the light 






of a critique of the concept of influence, his work seeks to raise some new 
historiographical possibilities through analysis of some of the pioneers of scuola positiva 
in Brazil – such as João Vieira de Araújo and Francisco Viveiros de Castro – and of the 
Brazilian appropriation of the scheme “scuola classica” versus “scuola positiva”.  
 
When the Italian scuola positiva arrived in Brazil, how this cultural circulation 
functioned, how Brazilian positivists addressed the new penal code issued in 1890, and, 
above all, what the relationship between the scuola positiva’s ideas and the previous 
Brazilian legal tradition was – these are some of the topics addressed by Sontag’s article. 
Given that the Brazilian legal tradition in the 19th century was different from that which 
the Italian positivists found when elaborating the scuola classica concept, this space of 
memory was occupied in Brazil by other elements. In Brazil, it was impossible to 
elaborate the past opponents of the scuola positiva with powerful treaties such as 
Francesco Carrara’s Programma del corso di diritto criminale, but there were other 
elements absent from Italian legal culture, such as two national penal codes 
(corresponding to 1830 and 1890.) 
 
In addition, the article also notes a difference between the willingness of Brazilian 
lawyers to insert themselves into the international criminal debate and their willingness 
to translate the results of these debates into a reform program applicable in the short or 
medium term for the Brazilian context. Clearly more important was their insertion into 
the international debate. Furthermore, this article was able to elaborate an interpretation 
that is not based on a sender-centric approach for the comprehension of a set of sources 
permeated by sender-centric visions (influence, diffusion, and so on). It seems a paradox, 
but it is actually the typical historiographical operation that was uncovered by Sontag’s 
article: on the one hand, to take the sources’ discourse seriously; on the other hand, 
historiographical narrative should not turn into a repetition of the sources’ discourse; that 
is, the flexible use of historiographical theoretical tools for the comprehension of the past 
is unavoidable for historians. 
 
To sum it up, the abovementioned works reflect the rise and relevance of criminal 
positivism in Europe and Latin America at the end of the 19th century, but also the 
uneasiness and resistance it triggered in many civil law jurisdictions, as the title of this 
article – and of the whole research project behind it – reads. Most of the articles clearly 
show the limits of criminal positivism in the Western world, although some of them might 
be even furtherly explored.22 All contributors would be notably satisfied if the final 
outcomes published in this issue of GLOSSAE might contribute to shed light on a 
fascinating part of the Western criminal law tradition that deserves an interdisciplinary 









                                               
22 As it will be done soon by Michele Pifferi (ed.), The Limits of Criminological Positivism. The 
Movement for Criminal Law Reform in the West, 1870-1940, Abingdone, 2021 (forthcoming). 
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